Huawei mobile phone channel

In two months, the number of fans of Huawei’s terminal division chairman Yu Chengdong increased from 150,000 to 300,000, enough to see the influence of the communications giant after its high-end smartphone business.

On April 18th, Huawei's Ascend P1 mobile phone was released, and speculation on the Huawei mobile phone channel in the industry was finally announced: Huawei handed over P1's proxy rights to Tianyin Communications, Phone World, and Suning.

However, behind this hot new domestic brand forces exerting power to the channel behind, it hides the conflict between brand strategy and channel reality. In the past, Huawei, which had only an operator channel, used social channels as the main channel strategy for the first time. This kind of transformation corresponds to high-end positioning. For Huawei, it is tantamount to one channel being “difficult”.

In foreign countries, Huawei’s branding machines have been booming. Last year, Huawei’s global sales of mobile phones were 55 million units, of which 20 million were smart machines. A large part of this achievement is due to the local operator channels that have been cultivated over the years. At present, it is worrying that Huawei’s aspiring Huawei is making a move to China. The huge B2B architecture that has taken more than 20 years to build has hidden potential between the old and new channels, corporate culture and marketing in the B2C transformation process of Huawei’s terminal services. With many conflicts, how will Huawei resolve them?

E-commerce channels are opening higher and lower While maintaining the existing channel of operators, Huawei has begun to try social channels and e-commerce channels. Huawei, which was trying e-commerce for the first time, seems to be confronted with "conflicts and tricks" when it starts.

On March 18, Huawei Mall officially opened its doors. Among the 10 types of terminal products, there is a high-end product "Honor Glory U8860" which was released in January of this year and listed at the end of February. The online price is 2,499 yuan. Previously, on the domestic first-line e-commerce platform, Jingdong and Amazon sold the product in the same period and the price was 2,499 yuan.

However, on the eve of the opening of Huawei Mall, Jingdong reduced the actual price to more than 1,900 yuan and gave it away. To this end, Yu Chengdong fired two consecutive shots inside the company on Weibo.

A few days after Yu Chengdong “fired himself,” Huawei Mall quietly adjusted the prices of its products on the platform. If you log into the mall after March 25th, customers will find that Glory Mobile has been reduced to 1950 yuan. This price adjustment once formed a price gap with Amazon, and soon Amazon also conducted a package price adjustment. Terminal shops that have already distributed goods are just about to adjust their prices.

Zhu Bo, president of Huawei's Internet business, introduced in the official Weibo. In addition to the e-Mall, Huawei will also cooperate with JD.com and Dangdang e-commerce channels to sell some terminal products through e-commerce channels.

As for doubts about Huawei's unique and unclear positioning of its products, Zhu Bo said in microblogs: “I am very aware of the fact that there are still many deficiencies in this mall, but Huawei’s traditional communication companies have such a move that is not easy... ...I have come to appreciate the internal and external challenges faced by Huawei in the Internet and consumer sectors."

On April 18th, the new channel strategy was announced. The protagonists were social channels such as Tianyin Communications and Phone World. In the distribution of channel power, Huawei handed over Ascend P1, the key product of this year’s flagship mobile phone, “turning to consumers”, to social channels. Huawei’s sources disclosed that Ascend P1’s first shipment of 2 million units was the only one. The appointed distributor is Tianyin Communication; and the e-commerce channel only has the starting line of the mid-range “Magnolia” series, which does not seem to have gained a considerable policy and status, and it is not reflected in the official website Huawei Mall. What price advantage.

Can't jump out of the "white card trap"

Huawei's Terminal Division was once an obscure “little role”, and later it became one of the company's core departments by leveraging the rapid development of the smart phone market. However, behind the impressive sales of terminal sales, it is a low profit that makes people laugh and cry. The reason is that Huawei has never been able to jump out of the "white card trap."

Huawei entered the field of mobile terminals in 2003 and is responsible for only one business unit in this area. According to Ren Zhengfei’s statement, “We did not think of a terminal at that time. We were forced to launch it. Because our 3G system cannot be sold, there is no matching mobile phone, we have to buy a terminal, we cannot buy it, and we are forced to launch it.”

Before 2010, Huawei's terminal basically produced mobile phones for operators in a customized form, and together with other 3G network devices, bundled sales to operators, among which mobile phones basically belonged to “Titou” and were not sold directly to consumers. Few advertisements are advertised. In addition, there are a small number of terminal products that mobile phones flow to social channels, commonly known as “cottage machines,” and the industry’s elegant name is “white machine”.

After Huawei obtained the telecom handset production license in March 2005, it was still positioned as an operator terminal customizing department and had no independent marketing channel. Shortly afterwards, the terminal department became an independent business unit of Huawei, but its status in various business units has been low, and it is seen as a secondary business group that is divorced from the main business.

According to Wang Yanhui, the secretary general of the China Mobile Alliance, “Before 2010, the CEOs of Huawei's terminal departments all came from other business divisions, and most of the CEOs were reluctant to serve in the terminal department. Until Yu Chengdong took charge, the situation only took root. change."

In fact, this "small department" has maintained a double-digit percentage increase in sales for several years. For example, from 2007 to 2009, the total sales volume of Huawei's terminal divisions increased from 2.6 billion U.S. dollars to 4 billion U.S. dollars and 5 billion U.S. dollars. People have no way of knowing their profit levels, but it is clear that their low-price “stuck head marketing” strategy has been an important bargaining chip for Huawei’s sales of corporate communications equipment.

The year 2010 is a year when Huawei’s mobile phones have undergone major changes. First of all, Guo Ping, president of the terminal business unit, said that the number of intelligent opportunities under 1,000 yuan has grown explosively, and five models of this price range have been introduced; given the optimistic outlook for the future handheld terminal market, Huawei proposed the "cloud management" technology strategy. As an important business module, the terminal has received attention; at the end of the year, Ren Zhengfei convened the cadres of the terminal business department to hold talks and put forward many objectives; in this year, China entered the era of smart phones, and Huawei also began to develop including e-commerce. Social sales channels.

Ren Zhengfei said: "Huawei Terminal must become an important player in this field. By 2012, sales will exceed US$10 billion." Since then, the status of the Terminal Division has started to increase and it has become one of the four core business units. Huawei Mobile Phones Also bid farewell to the simple "Titoutou Marketing" era.

Afterwards, in 2011, Huawei's terminal segmented its mobile phone business and network terminal business. The mobile terminal seeks to transform itself through measures such as using thousands of smart machines, opening up new sales channels, building cloud mobile phones and cloud strategy platforms, and transforming marketing strategies.

According to statistics, Huawei's terminals in the first three quarters of 2011 accounted for 12 billion yuan in total orders in the Chinese market, an increase of 59.1% over the same period of the previous year, of which mobile phone orders were worth 8 billion yuan, an increase of 104.1% year-on-year.

However, the above-mentioned seemingly gratifying sales growth did not bring huge profits to Huawei's terminals. At the WMC show, Yu Chengdong revealed in an interview with a media reporter that Huawei’s mobile phone products “poorly profitable” and allegedly have a low net profit rate of single digits.

At present, Huawei's terminal products make up 65% of total shipments through operators, and 35% of sales through retail channels and other channels. As the ex-factory price of the order machine was severely lowered, the profit was also lower.

Huawei once positioned itself at a low price and gained sales growth through the channels of operators. However, at the operating level, a serious product orientation, a low-profile marketing stance, and excessive dependence on the operator's single market channel formed the aforementioned "White card trap": There are sales, lack of profits.

Yu Chengdong said in Weibo: “Last year, almost all senior operators and channel partners told me: 'Although your product is very good, with your Huawei mobile phone brand is very low visibility, the price of mobile phones can not exceed 2,000 yuan'. ”

The years of weakness have caused Huawei to learn a lesson: Channels must be transformed, social channels must be expanded, and products must take high-end routes, otherwise they cannot make money. After Yu Chengdong took over as CEO of the Terminal Division, the first task he must complete is to jump out of the "white card trap" and establish his brand strategy.

As the sales channels are too dependent on operators, Huawei's glory and vision for the first high-end products in 2012 will be difficult to promote. Yu Chengdong admitted in his Weibo: "Our channel capabilities are too weak, and operator selection and access operations are also very slow."

Underestimate the attitude of low-key "Tim head" image of the high sales of low-margin, low-profit, so that Huawei's tasteless terminal equipment, such as tasteless abandoned pity. Since Yu Chengdong took office at the beginning of 2011, Huawei's terminal products have tried to take the high-quality route of high-quality products, positioning to the high-end, and tried to market word-of-mouth with the “most” and “first” products.

On January 10, at the CES (Consumer Electronics Show, Consumer Electronics Show) held in Las Vegas, Huawei launched the Ascend P1 S, the so-called "world's thinnest smart phone." On January 18, Huawei released a low profile on Android. In the end, in 2010, white-brand mobile phones also dominated the half of the Chinese mobile phone market. However, in 2011, due to the triple blows of patents, markets, and national policies, the sales of such phones decreased by 7%, and the market share fell to 42%. Industry insiders expect that sales will drop by another 30% this year.

Sales volume continued to decline, causing the closure of white mobile phone manufacturers in Shenzhen, the world's largest mobile phone manufacturing city.

The white cell phone closed down in the 4.0 wave cell phone market and became the first cell phone brand to officially release the Android 4.0 commercial version in the Chinese market. The Ascend D quad phone is equipped with a Hass K3V2 processor, and the performance index is known as the “most” in the world.

Yu Chengdong said: "Because there is not so much money to advertise, especially in the Internet age, people often can only remember the first, can not remember the second; only concerned about and dissemination of the world's first products. So Huawei to "the most powerful "The 'world's first' product is gaining the attention of global media and evaluation." The "most strategic" features such as the fastest, thinnest and most cost-effective feature have been shaped.

From a marketing point of view, this is actually a production-oriented concept that has begun to shift toward product orientation. Product orientation believes that consumers prefer high-quality products that contain more performance and attribute characteristics. Their product quality and improvement are an important part of their marketing.

Now, Huawei's new mobile phone is against the low price and general performance image, leaping up, breaking the domestic mobile phone can not exceed 2,000 yuan "hidden rules", from a side reflects the ambition of Huawei's terminal business department's intention to rise, trying to bid farewell to the phone's " Tim Head" status.

For Huawei's transformation, Huang Xiaoqing, president of the China Mobile Research Institute, believes that: "Huawei has gradually evolved from a system manufacturer brand to a consumer brand. Huawei mobile phones have entered a brand growth phase in recent years, from no brand to a brand, from a brand To build a brand, it needs to have a growing process."

Zero Advance Strategy Zeng Jun, IT Telecom Director of Shanghai Corporation, also believes that Huawei is an engineer-oriented, technology-oriented, B2B company that specializes in customer internal marketing, while the mobile phone business is outside salesman, designer, market-oriented and external. Marketing-oriented B2C services—Huawei needs to bridge the gap between the two.

Marketing is the short leg of Huawei, and its roots are still derived from Huawei's low-key genes. Ren Zhengfei wrote in the 148th edition of the “Management Optimization” published in February 2001 that “To treat the media, I hope all staff members will keep a low profile because we are not a listed company and therefore do not need to publicize the society. We are mainly responsible for the government. Responsible for the effective operation of the company.The media have their own rules of operation, we do not want to participate, some of our employees are on the Internet for corporate debates, is to help the company's downfall.The media said hello, you are not happy, you It may not be really good; if you say you are not good, you can see if there is any room for improvement. There are actually reports that are different. Don't worry about it. It will be a long time. I hope everyone will be quiet."

In addition to the activities attended by senior government leaders, Ren Zhengfei has never participated in large-scale public events, including the successive IT leaders' summit hosted by the Shenzhen Municipal Government. Li Dongsheng, Shi Lirong, and Ma Huateng, the founders of the local IT giant in Shenzhen, attended the conference. The boss regards attending the summit as an opportunity for brand marketing, and its media attention is obvious.

"Ren Zhengfei is outrageously low-profile. Those who are traditional 2G handsets are still not well adapted to the smart phone market. Ren Zhengfei is certainly not easy to enter the terminal field with telecommunications equipment vendors." said Huawei's channel provider Wang Zhuo, Huawei is good at marketing to the government and companies, but it is a primary school student in terminal marketing.

Huawei's terminal products also face the problem of insufficient marketing and investment. It is understood that Huawei's R&D investment in 2009 and 2010 were 13.3 billion yuan and 16.5 billion yuan, respectively, which accounted for 8.9% of the year's revenue. However, the investment in brand marketing has been less than 1% over the years. The domestic IT brand enterprises generally contribute more than 3% of sales.

For a long time, Ren Zhengfei's low-key personality has cultivated a low-key culture throughout Huawei, and now requires high-profile marketing. This has formed two distinct corporate cultures within Huawei, which has directly led to Huawei's B2C category's terminal strategy being repeatedly frustrated. This kind of corporate culture is in opposition, leading Huawei to gradually form a "long leg" pattern between R & D and marketing.

The “off track” retail channel lacks attractiveness. The opening of the e-commerce channel presented in this article may not yet lead to the conclusion that the e-commerce channel has been frustrated. However, even if it is a traditional channel that is highly valued by Huawei, the related expansion is actually also It did not go well. Although Huawei is determined to take the fine line, traditional channel providers still have concerns about the "adding head" image of Huawei's terminals.

The first is that the inherent corporate culture makes Huawei unable to determine the e-commerce channel and traditional channels, resulting in conflict between the two. Yu Chengdong disclosed on numerous occasions that Huawei's own brand terminal equipment will move to e-commerce channels on the basis of maintaining the original operator channels. In addition, traditional social channels are also expanding. In fact, the e-commerce platform is just an operation method of brand marketing. According to a regional manager of Huawei terminal, Huawei pays more attention to the major traditional channels in the country.

Secondly, judging from the current channel layout, social retail channels are still Huawei's shortcomings. Huawei, which lacks brand awareness and social channels, faces a “high and low” situation in the promotion of end products.

According to a regional manager of Huawei Terminal, Huawei’s new glory, in addition to China Unicom’s already-existing volume of goods, has slowed down in cooperation with telecoms and mobiles. As for traditional social channels, except for Gome and Suning, which have already spread goods in some areas, other social channels have been slow to negotiate.

In the near-term stores of Gome and Suning in Haizhu District of Guangzhou, Huawei did not have any glory. Industry sources explained that the Guangzhou channel is not so easy to talk about. For channel providers, the brand influence of domestic mobile phones is an important factor. The product design and configuration of “Glory” is better than foreign brands, but the reputation is still lacking.

Again, Huawei's low-key and conservative style makes it difficult for channel providers to cooperate with them. According to some channels, the important factor for channel operation is upstream support. Manufacturers have the determination to invest in channels, and the market can do well. Because the operation of channels is very complicated, there must be deep determination. E-commerce is more of an ingredient that needs to be hyped up in terms of channels. Although the prospects are good, they do not see Huawei's data, and they do not know how much they sell. Moreover, e-commerce channels will conflict with traditional channels.

At present, Huawei's terminal division is still conducting Da Teng Nuo, and personnel adjustments have been made in the channel, including the head of the Guangzhou office. Currently, the surname is paid by a surnamed manager. Local channel distributors had a telephone conversation with them at the end of March. The channel provider said: “We are optimistic about the prospects of domestic high-end brands. However, we have not yet seen the channel strategy of Huawei. We have not mentioned the issue of cooperation conditions in our negotiations.”

In this regard, Wang Zhuo believes that Huawei's matrix management model may not be suitable for channel management. This will be another challenge for Huawei.

Regarding why the Huawei terminal does not release its policy on the channel, an internal employee explained that: "Ren Zhengfei does not like internal corruption the least. It is easy to see corruption in the channels. Therefore, Huawei has always had full control over the channel policy. Firmly."